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Abstract
This paper uses quantile regressions to document the increase in tail sensi-
tivities between hedge funds in times of crisis. We identify seven factors that
explain this tail dependence and show that o› oading the risk associated with
them signi￿cantly reduces spillover e⁄ects. However, we also show that it is
costly for hedge funds to o› oad tail risk in terms of returns and ￿ ows.
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Our ￿nancial architecture has undergone dramatic changes in recent years as market
based ￿nancial institutions have gained ever more importance in the allocation of cap-
ital and credit. The hedge fund sector has become one of the key parts of the market
based ￿nancial system, supporting liquidity provision and price discovery across ￿nan-
cial markets. While hedge funds are liquidity providers in usual times, during times of
market crisis, they can be forced to delever, potentially contributing to market volatil-
ity. The extent to which various hedge fund strategies are exposed to the tail risk that
occurs during market turmoil is important to understand for risk management and
￿nancial stability purposes. This paper provides a framework for understanding the
tail risk exposures of hedge fund strategies in more detail.
The recent global ￿nancial crisis provides several examples of large hedge fund
failures. The beginning of the crisis in June 2007 was marked by the failure of two
highly levered structured credit hedge funds owned by Bear Stearns. Subsequently, in
March 2008￿ less than two weeks prior to Bear Stearns￿failure￿ the Carlyle Capital
Corporation, another highly levered ￿xed income hedge fund, declared bankruptcy due
to margin calls. In addition, the hedge fund sector as a whole experienced severe losses
following the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008.
During the ￿nancial crisis, distress spread across institutions due to liquidity spirals.
In a liquidity spiral, initial losses in some asset classes force levered investors to reduce
their positions, which leads to additional mark-to-market losses and potential spillovers
to other asset classes. Importantly, margins and haircuts widen at the same time,
forcing levered investors to reduce their leverage ratio. (Brunnermeier and Pedersen
(2009)). As such, banks and prime brokers with large credit risk exposures to hedge
1funds may su⁄er potentially large losses if many hedge funds experience distress at
the same time. From a ￿nancial stability point of view, it is therefore important
to understand the degree to which di⁄erent hedge fund strategies tend to experience
simultaneous large losses.
In this paper, we use quantile regressions to empirically study the interdependencies
between di⁄erent hedge fund styles in times of crisis. We ￿nd that tail sensitivities
between di⁄erent strategies are higher in times of distress, suggesting the potential
for simultaneous losses across many hedge funds. Furthermore, we identify seven risk
factors that are related to these tail dependencies and show that o› oading this risk
signi￿cantly reduces the sensitivities where we de￿ne o› oaded returns as the residuals
obtained from regressing the raw returns on the seven risk factors. However￿ consistent
with existing literature￿ we also ￿nd that these factors explain a large part of hedge
funds￿expected returns, and we provide some evidence suggesting that capital ￿ ows
across strategies and over time reward those that load more heavily on the tail risk
factors. Consequently, while o› oading would be bene￿cial for a fund manager in the
sense that it would reduce his exposure to tail risk, managers face strong incentives
to load on tail risk factors as they tend to increase both the incentive fee (calculated
as a percentage of the fund￿ s pro￿t) as well as their management fee (calculated as a
percentage of total assets under management).
Related Literature. Our paper contributes to the growing literature that sheds
light on the link between hedge funds and the risk of a systemic crisis. Boyson, Stahel,
and Stulz (2008) document contagion across hedge fund styles using logit regressions
on daily and monthly returns. However, they do not ￿nd evidence of contagion between
hedge fund returns and equity, ￿xed income and foreign exchange returns. In contrast,
2we show that our pricing factors explain the increase in comovement among hedge
fund strategies in times of stress. Chan, Getmansky, Haas, and Lo (2006) document
an increase in correlation across hedge funds, especially prior to the LTCM crisis and
after 2003. Adrian (2007) points out that this increase in correlation since 2003 is due
to a reduction in volatility￿ phenomenon that occurred across many ￿nancial assets￿
rather than to an increase in covariance. Dudley and Nimalendran (2010) present an
empirical analysis of the liquidity spiral associated with margin increases in futures
exchanges. The methods used in this paper to analyze the tail risk exposures of hedge
funds to risk factors have also been used in Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009). However,
while Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009) focus on the quanti￿cation of systemic risk of
each ￿nancial institutions, the current paper focuses on the hedging of tail risk, not
quantifying systemic risk.
Asness, Krail, and Liew (2001) and Agarwal and Naik (2004) document that hedge
funds load on tail risk in order to boost their CAPM-￿. Agarwal and Naik (2004)
capture the tail exposure of equity hedge funds with non-linear market factors that take
the shape of out-of-the-money put options. Patton (2009) develops several ￿neutrality
tests￿including a test for tail and VaR neutrality and ￿nds that many so-called market
neutral funds are, in fact, not market neutral. Bali, Gokcan, and Liang (2007) and
Liang and Park (2007) ￿nd that hedge funds that take on high left-tail risk outperform
funds with less risk exposure. In addition, a large and growing number of papers
explain average returns of hedge funds using asset pricing factors (see e.g. Fung and
Hsieh (2001, 2002, 2003), Hasanhodzic and Lo (2007)). Our approach is di⁄erent in the
sense that we study factors that explain the co-dependence across the tails of di⁄erent
hedge fund styles.
In Section 2, we study the tail dependencies between hedge fund strategies in normal
3times and during crises. In Section 3, we estimate a risk factor model for the hedge
fund returns and show that tail risk factors explain a large part of the dependencies
between the strategies. We also study the incentives hedge funds face in taking on tail
risk. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2 q-Sensitivities
In this section, we examine the pairwise dependence of returns between hedge fund
styles. We ￿nd that these dependencies are signi￿cantly higher in times of stress. We
call these dependencies among hedge funds in times of stress ￿q￿sensitivities￿ , because
we use quantile regressions to estimate them. The q stands for the tail quantile for
which the dependence is estimated.
2.1 Hedge Fund Return Data
As private investment partnerships that are largely unregulated, hedge funds are more
challenging to analyze and monitor than other ￿nancial institutions such as mutual
funds, banks, or insurance companies. Only very limited data on hedge funds are
made available through regulatory ￿lings and, consequently, most studies rely on self-
reported data.1 We follow this approach and use the hedge fund style indices compiled
by Credit Suisse/Tremont.
Several papers have compared the self-reported returns of di⁄erent vendors (e.g.,
Agarwal and Naik (2005)), and some research compares the return characteristics of
hedge fund indices with the returns of individual funds (Malkiel and Saha (2005)). The
1A notable exception is a study by Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004), who use quarterly 13F ￿lings to
the SEC and show that hedge funds were riding the tech-bubble rather than acting as price-correcting
force.
4literature also investigates biases such as survivorship bias (Brown, Goetzmann, and
Ibbotson (1999) and Liang (2000)), termination and self-selection bias (Ackermann,
McEnally, and Ravenscraft (1999)), back￿lling bias, and illiquidity bias (Asness, Krail,
and Liew (2001) and Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004)). We take from this literature
that, while hedge fund return indices are certainly not ideal, they are still the best data
available and their study is useful. Moreover, Malkiel and Saha (2005) provide evidence
that the Credit Suisse/Tremont indices appear to be the least a⁄ected by various biases.
[Table 1]
Table 1 displays summary statistics of monthly excess returns for the ten hedge
fund style indices included in the Credit Suisse/Tremont data over the period January
1994-November 2009. These styles have been extensively described in the literature
(see Agarwal and Naik (2005) for a survey), and characterizations can also be found
on the Credit Suisse/Tremont website (www.hedgeindex.com). We report the hedge
fund returns in order of their average weights in the overall index, calculated over the
entire sample period. These weights are determined by the proportion of total assets
under management in the hedge fund sector dedicated to each strategy, and the average
values are reported in the last column of Table 1. We also report summary statistics of
monthly excess returns for the overall hedge fund index, as well as for the CRSP equity
market excess return, which we sometimes interpret as a proxy for a well-diversi￿ed
mutual fund. The cumulative returns to the overall hedge fund index and the market
are shown in Figure 1.
[Figure 1]
Table 1 shows that, while there is a wide disparity of Sharpe ratios across di⁄erent
strategies, the Sharpe ratio of the overall hedge fund index (0.21) is more than twice
5the Sharpe ratio of the market (0.09). Since hedge funds invest part of their wealth
in highly illiquid instruments with stale or managed prices, they are able to smooth
their returns and manipulate Sharpe ratios (see e.g. Asness, Krail, and Liew (2001)
and Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004)). The summary statistics also show that
the hedge fund index has less negative skewness than the market return (-0.27 versus
-0.86) and higher kurtosis (5.26 versus 4.43). With the exception of Managed Futures,
normality is rejected on the basis of either skewness or kurtosis for all hedge fund styles.
Thus, consistent with previous ￿ndings, the returns to hedge funds have both skewed
and fat-tailed returns relative to normality.
2.2 Quantile Regressions
In this section, we use bivariate quantile regressions to analyze the tail sensitivities be-
tween di⁄erent hedge fund strategies. Quantile regressions were developed by Koenker
and Bassett (1978) and Bassett and Koenker (1978), and a literature review can be
found in Koenker (2005).













To study the tail dependence of strategy i with respect to strategy j, we extract the
￿
ij
q from Equation 1.
De￿nition 1 We denote the q-sensitivity of strategy i with respect to strategy j as
the coe¢ cient ￿
ij
q from the q-percent bivariate quantile regression of strategy i￿ s excess
returns on strategy j￿ s excess returns.
Our de￿nition of the q-sensitivity captures the degree to which the tail returns of
6strategy i comoves with the returns of strategy j. By varying the quantile q, we can
analyze how the dependencies between hedge fund strategies change between normal
times (q = 50) and times of crisis (e.g., q = 5).
Note that quantile regressions lend themselves to an easy method of calculating the
Value-at-Risk (VaR), which we use later in Section 3.4. In particular, the 5% quantile
of strategy i￿ s return provides a direct estimate of (the negative of) its VaR. Adrian
and Brunnermeier (2009) use this property of quantile regressions to generate a novel
measure of systemic risk, CoVaR, which they de￿ne as the VaR of the ￿nancial sector
conditional on a particular institution being in distress.
Table 2 reports the 50%- and 5%-sensitivities calculated from bivariate quantile
regressions among the ten hedge fund strategies. For each strategy i, we calculate
its q-sensitivity with respect to each of the nine other strategies, and then average to
obtain a single 50%￿ and 5% sensitivity. For each strategy, we also calculate the percent
change in the average 5%-sensitivity relative to the 50%, along with its p-value.
[Table 2]
Table 2 shows that average hedge fund sensitivities increase in the tails of the return
distribution. For all the strategies, except for Dedicated Short Bias, the average 5%￿
sensitivity is higher than the 50% sensitivity, with the di⁄erence statistically signi￿cant
in ￿ve cases. The last row in Table 2 reports the sensitivities weighted by their average
weight in the overall index over this period. By this measure, we ￿nd that average
sensitivities are nearly 50% higher in times of stress compared to normal times, indi-
cating higher dependence between strategies and the potential for simultaneous losses
during a crisis. The increase in sensitivities among hedge fund styles in times of stress
has previously been noted by Boyson, Stahel, and Stulz (2008).
73 Identifying Tail Factors
Having established that sensitivities between hedge fund styles increase during times
of stress, in this section we identify factors that explain this tail dependence. We de￿ne
o› oaded returns as the residuals obtained from regressing the raw returns on the seven
risk factors. We argue that the factor structure explains this tail dependence if the
sensitivities of the o› oaded returns are much lower than those of the raw returns.
We begin by outlining our seven risk factors, and then create o› oaded returns for
each of the hedge fund styles as well as for the ￿nancial institution indices. We then
generate 50%- and 5%-sensitivities using these o› oaded returns.
3.1 Tail Factors - Description and Data
We select the following seven factors to try to capture the increase in tail dependence
among hedge fund strategies. All seven factors have solid theoretical foundations and
are included to capture certain aspects of risk. Moreover, they are also all liquid and
easily tradable. Our factors are:
(i) the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) market return in excess of
the 3-month bill rate;
(ii) the VIX straddle excess return to capture the implied future volatility of the
stock market. The VIX is from the CBOE, we get a tradable excess return series by
calculating the hypothetical at-the-money straddle return that is based on the VIX
implied volatility, and then subtract the 3-month bill rate.
(iii) the variance swap return to capture the associated risk premium for shifts
in volatility. The variance swap contract pays the di⁄erence between the realized
variance over the coming month and its delivery price at the beginning of the month.
8Since the delivery price is not observable over our whole sample period, we use - as





The realization of the index variance is computed from daily S&P 500 Index data for
each month. Note that, since the initial price of the swap contract is zero, returns are
automatically expressed as excess returns.
(iv) a short-term "liquidity spread", de￿ned as the di⁄erence between the 3-month
general collateral repo rate and the 3-month bill rate. We use the 3-month repo rate
available on Bloomberg and obtain the 3-month Treasury rate from the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York.
(v) the carry-trade excess return is calculated using the Deutsche Bank carry USD
total return index. The index is constructed from a carry strategy on the G10 currencies
that is rolled over quarterly. The index is long the three highest-yielding currencies
and short the three lowest-yielding currencies.
(vi) the slope of the yield curve, measured by the yield spread between the 10-year
Treasury rate and the 3-month bill rate from the Federal Reserve Board￿ s H.15 release.
(vii) the credit spread between BAA rated bonds and the Treasury rate (with same
maturity of 10 years) from the Federal Reserve Board￿ s H.15 release.
All data are monthly from January 1994 through November 2009. Summary sta-
tistics are presented in Table 3.
[Table 3]
3.2 O› oaded Returns
Having speci￿ed our factors, we generate o› oaded returns and study their e⁄ect on the
q-sensitivities. In particular, we look at quantile o› oaded returns￿ i.e., the residuals
9to the 5%-quantile regression of raw returns on our seven factors. More formally, we
de￿ne o› oaded returns in the following way.
De￿nition 2 Consider the q%￿quantile regression of hedge fund strategy i onto a
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O› oaded returns ~ Ri





Monthly raw and o› oaded returns for the ten hedge fund strategies, as well as for
the overall index, are plotted in Figure 2. In most cases, o› oading the risk associated
with our factors reduces the volatility of the monthly returns.
[Figure 2] [Table 4]
Table 4 displays the summary statistics for these o› oaded returns. Comparing
to Table 1, we see that o› oading tail risk markedly reduces the weighted average
mean return and Sharpe ratio of the ten hedge fund strategies (and the di⁄erence is
statistically signi￿cant). Looking at individual styles, some o› oaded mean returns and
Sharpe ratios even enter negative territory. The kernel densities in Figure 3 reveal that
o› oading reduces the fat left tail of the overall index, while having little e⁄ect on the
right tail.
[Figure 3]
Table 5 compares the CAPM-￿￿ s of the total and o› oaded returns for the hedge
fund strategies. We see that the ￿￿ s drop notably after o› oading the risk associated
with our factors; the weighted average ￿ declines from 0:40 to 0:13. Note that we take
the simple average of ￿￿ s rather than the average of the absolute value of the ￿￿ s since
it is not easy to short a hedge fund style.
[Table 5]
103.3 q-Sensitivities of O› oaded Returns
As we did for the raw returns in Section 2, we replicate the bivariate 5%-quantile
regressions for the o› oaded returns. That is, we quantile regress the o› oaded returns
of style i on the o› oaded returns of style j and calculate the average 5%-sensitivity
for each strategy. Table 6 compares the average 5%-sensitivities calculated using total
and o› oaded returns, and also displays the percent change of the o› oaded sensitivities
relative to the total along with their p-value.
[Table 6]
Table 6 shows that, with the exception of only three strategies, using o› oaded re-
turns unequivocally decreases the 5%-sensitivity by a statistically signi￿cant margin. In
fact, the weighted average shows that o› oading the tail risk reduces the 5%-sensitivity
by more than 75%. Figure 4 con￿rms these results by plotting the weighted average
q-sensitivity across the hedge fund styles for all q between 5 and 95. We see that the
q-sensitivity of the o› oaded returns are generally well below that of the raw returns:
[Figure 4]
Beyond looking at sensitivities across states of the world (i.e., for di⁄erent values
of q), we can also investigate their evolution over time. To do so, we estimate a
multivariate BEKK-ARCH(2) model and extract the evolution of covariances across
the ten strategies over time. The average of these covariances is shown in Figure 5.
[Figure 5]
The average covariance of the o› oaded returns is markedly less volatile than that of
the total returns. While the average covariance of total returns spiked during the LTCM
11crisis in the third quarter of 1998, in January 2000, and, most dramatically, following
the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, the average covariance of the
o› oaded returns increased much less during the same periods.
These results strongly suggest that interdependencies between di⁄erent hedge fund
styles could be signi￿cantly reduced were funds to o› oad the tail risk associated with
our seven factors. From a ￿nancial stability point of view, this is desirable as it would
reduce the potential for simultaneous losses across many strategies during a crisis.
However, it is possible that individual fund managers face no such incentive to o› oad
tail risk. We investigate this in the following section.
3.4 Incentives to Load on Tail Risk
Because our seven factors were chosen to be tradable and highly liquid, it would be
possible for hedge fund managers to o› oad the associated risk without incurring large
trading costs. Consequently, o› oading is ￿-neutral within our model. However, as
noted previously in our comparison of Tables 1 and 4, o› oading this risk signi￿cantly
reduces the weighted average monthly return of the hedge funds from 0:51 to 0:08. In
other words, a large proportion of hedge funds￿outperformance relative to the market
index appears to be a direct result of their loading on these ￿tail￿factors. Consequently,
the question arises whether hedge fund managers have any incentive to o› oad this risk,
when doing so would lower their expected return.
Fund managers are typically paid a performance fee of 20% of the realized pro￿ts
plus 2% of the value of total assets under management. As such, though o› oading tail
risk lowers the manager￿ s expected compensation via the performance fee, the expected
compensation via the management fee may actually be higher if o› oading risk leads
to increased in￿ ows into the fund.
12To investigate this, we study these ￿ ows and compare the e⁄ects of average returns
and various risk measures on ￿ ows across strategies and over time. We use the weights
of each strategy within the overall hedge fund index to generate a measure of relative
￿ ow￿ i.e., the ￿ ow into strategy i is expressed as a proportion of total ￿ ow into the
hedge fund sector. Recall that wi
t, the weight of strategy i in the overall index, is
determined according to the proportion of total hedge fund assets under management


















t+1 are the monthly returns to strategy i and the overall index,
respectively. Consequently, our ￿ ow variable adjusts changes in the relative weights of
each strategy between t and t + 1 by the return of each strategy relative to the index
return.
[Table 7]
Table 7 shows that, as expected, ￿ ows are very sensitive to past monthly and annual
returns. However, we ￿nd that taking on more risk, as indicated by higher VaRs, is
also associated with larger future ￿ ows. This indicates that o› oading tail risk not
only reduces hedge fund managers￿expected compensation via their performance fee
(through lower expected returns), but also punishes them with lower management fees
by reducing in￿ ows. Consequently, while o› oading the risk associated with our factors
may be highly desirable from a systemic risk point of view, individual managers have
no incentive to do so and, in fact, seem to be rewarded for loading more heavily on
these tail risk factors.
134 Conclusion
Our paper documents that sensitivities between hedge fund styles increase in the tails,
leading to the potential for simultaneous large losses across di⁄erent strategies. We
identify seven factors that can account for this increase in tail dependence in times
of crisis, and show that o› oading the risk associated with them greatly reduces the
sensitivities between hedge fund styles as well as between di⁄erent ￿nancial institutions.
However, o› oading tail risk might come at the cost of lower compensation for individual
hedge fund managers.
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